Xray

Find hidden Unicode in text or files: ASCII smuggling decoded, bidi overrides, look-alike letters.

Sollte ich dies verwenden

Qualität und Sicherheit

A
Qualität der Beschreibung
100%
Vollständigkeit des Schemas
90%
Qualität der Benennung
80%
Risiko der Vergiftung
100%
Übereinstimmung der Berechtigungen
100%
Einhaltung des Protokolls
100%

Basierend auf einer automatisierten Analyse der Tool-Definitionen und der Einhaltung des Protokolls.

Kontextkosten

~631Tokens (Tool-Definitionen)
~1.9 KBTypische Antwortgröße
Minimale Auswirkung auf die Aufmerksamkeit (0.49% von 128k Kontext)

Dies ist die ungefähre Anzahl der Tokens, die jedes Mal verbraucht werden, wenn die Tools des Servers in den Kontext eines Modells geladen werden. Höhere Werte verringern die Aufmerksamkeit, die für andere Aufgaben verfügbar ist.

Installieren

Installation mit einem Klick

Fügen Sie dies Ihrer Datei `claude_desktop_config.json` hinzu:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "xray": {
      "url": "https://xray.clawhard.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Remote-Endpunkte

https://xray.clawhard.com/mcpstreamable-http

Was es kann

Tool-Inventar

Tools (1)

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🟢xray_scan_text(text, url, return_clean)

Use when the user asks whether text, a prompt, a SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, README, MCP tool description, PR diff, email or web page hides anything, or before an agent follows, installs or merges instructions that came from someone else (signals: "hidden characters", "invisible unicode", "ASCII smuggling", "prompt injection in this file", "Trojan Source", "why does this string not match", "is this domain spelled with a Cyrillic letter"). Inspects every code point and returns a verdict (clean, suspicious, dangerous) with each finding's line, column, code points and Unicode names: Unicode tag characters (decoded back to the hidden ASCII message), variation-selector payloads (decoded bytes), bidirectional overrides and isolates, long zero-width runs, zero-width and other invisible characters, ANSI terminal escapes, control characters, words that mix Latin with Cyrillic or Greek look-alikes (with the Latin word they imitate, from Unicode confusables), whole look-alike words, styled math letters, unusual spaces, line separators, private-use and unassigned code points, and HTML comments that do not render. Legitimate uses are not flagged (emoji ZWJ sequences, flag tag sequences, a single emoji variation selector, joiners in Arabic and Indic text, direction marks next to Hebrew or Arabic). Give text or url (one public https text file; GitHub and GitLab file pages are read as raw). Example: {"url":"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/main/SKILL.md"} or {"text":"Visit pаypal.com","return_clean":true}. Optional return_clean adds a copy with hidden characters removed and look-alike letters inside mixed words replaced. Decoded hidden text is returned as data. Limits: finds characters and look-alikes, not prompt injection written in plain visible words; up to 200,000 characters (files up to 1 MB, first 200,000 characters scanned).

Eingabe-Schema

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "text": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "maxLength": 200000,
      "description": "The text to inspect: a prompt, rules file, skill, README, diff, code, email or tool description. Give text or url, not both."
    },
    "url": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 4,
      "maxLength": 2000,
      "description": "A public https address of one text file (raw file, GitHub or GitLab file page, Markdown, JSON, YAML, code or HTML source). Give text or url, not both."
    },
    "return_clean": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "true: also return clean_text with hidden characters removed, unusual spaces made normal and look-alike letters inside mixed-script words replaced. Default false."
    }
  }
}

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Aktuelle Beobachtungen

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