PayStage — x402 payment safety and spend policy

x402 payment safety: judge a payment against your policy before signing. No keys, never signs.

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Calidad y seguridad

A
Calidad de la descripción
100%
Integridad del esquema
77%
Calidad de los nombres
96%
Riesgo de envenenamiento
100%
Coincidencia de permisos
100%
Cumplimiento del protocolo
100%

Basado en el análisis automatizado de las definiciones de herramientas y el cumplimiento del protocolo.

Costo de contexto

~2,882Tokens (definiciones de herramientas)
~1.2 KBTamaño de respuesta típico
Impacto significativo en la atención (2.25% del contexto de 128k)

Este es el número aproximado de tokens que se consumen cada vez que las herramientas del servidor se cargan en el contexto de un modelo. Los recuentos más altos reducen la atención disponible para otras tareas.

Instalar

Instalación con un clic

Agrega esto a tu archivo `claude_desktop_config.json`:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "x402-payment-safety": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "@paystage/mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Paquetes ejecutables

npm@paystage/mcp0.8.17stdio

Puntos de conexión remotos

https://api.paystage.xyz/mcpstreamable-http

Qué puede hacer

Inventario de herramientas

Herramientas (10)

🟢 Solo lectura🟡 Escritura🔴 Eliminación⚪ Desconocido
🟢evaluate_mcp_payment(payment_required, policy_path, policy, agent_id, payment_identifier)

verify the recipient. Call this BEFORE signing any x402 payment. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay, each with stable reason codes (e.g. 'amount 1.00 USDC exceeds max_amount 0.05 USDC'). Fail-closed by design: do not invent authority — when policy, identity, cost or evidence is missing the answer is a refusal or a review, never a pay. A `review` verdict also carries a `packet` object with the amount and its share of the applicable cap, the payee, the rule that fired, the checks run and skipped, and the one decision being asked of the human; `pay` and `do_not_pay` do not. Returns the decision plus a signed receipt you can verify offline with verify_receipt, and a `bundle_id` naming the evidence bundle for this call (events, hashed inputs, receipt, summary). Read-only: holds no keys, never signs, never moves funds. A refusal costs nothing. This tool evaluates locally, so it makes no network calls and returns no seller reputation; the hosted HTTP API adds `seller_reputation` (domain and certificate age) because it can reach the network.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "payment_required": {},
    "policy_path": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy": {},
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Which agent is asking. Required to reach per-agent budgets in policy.agents.",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "payment_identifier": {
      "description": "The x402 payment-identifier for this challenge, if the seller or client supplies one. Passing the same value on a retry turns the second verdict into `review` instead of a second `pay`, because a retried preflight is not a second approval.",
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 128
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "payment_required"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢list_outstanding_auths(wallet, network, tokens, spenders, policy_path, ...)

spending limits. Call this when auditing what an agent could still spend without a new signature — ERC-20 allowances, Permit2 and EIP-3009 authorisations. Returns each authorisation with spender, amount and expiry. Read-only and needs only a public RPC; no key, no funds moved. Use it after an incident to see what remains exposed, not to revoke anything (this tool cannot revoke). Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "wallet": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "network": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tokens": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "spenders": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "policy_path": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy": {},
    "eip3009_nonces": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "rpc_url": {
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "wallet"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢evaluate_outstanding_auths(wallet, network, tokens, spenders, policy_path, ...)

spending limits. Call this when an agent already holds authorisations and you need to know which are dangerous. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per authorisation, with reason codes naming the rule that fired (unlimited allowance, expiry already passed, spender not on the allow-list). Returns per-authorisation decisions plus a summary action. Read-only: never revokes, never signs. Revocation is a transaction you send yourself. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "wallet": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "network": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tokens": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "spenders": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "policy_path": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy": {},
    "eip3009_nonces": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "rpc_url": {
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "wallet"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢evaluate_hip3_trade(proposal, policy, policy_path, snapshot)

transaction scope. Call this BEFORE an agent places a HIP-3 / trade.xyz order. Verdict is allow | review | do_not_trade, with the rule that fired (notional above cap, market not allowed, leverage too high). Returns the decision and a one-line reason. Local policy only: this is not financial advice, holds no keys, and cannot place or cancel an order. Prices come from a read-only market query. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "proposal": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "dex": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "asset": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "side": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "buy",
            "sell"
          ]
        },
        "size": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "leverage": {
          "type": "number"
        },
        "order_type": {
          "type": "string",
          "enum": [
            "limit",
            "market"
          ]
        },
        "limit_px": {
          "type": "string"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "dex",
        "asset",
        "side",
        "size"
      ]
    },
    "policy": {},
    "policy_path": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "snapshot": {}
  },
  "required": [
    "proposal"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢evaluate_velocity(history, proposed, policy, policy_path, now_ms)

transparent risk assessments. Call this when an agent is about to make its Nth payment and you need to know whether the rate itself is the risk. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay over a rolling window (per-hour and per-day spend, count of payees). Returns the decision plus which window was breached. Read-only: it reads the history you pass in, holds no keys, and calls no external service. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "history": {
      "default": [],
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object",
        "properties": {
          "id": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "timestamp_ms": {
            "type": "integer",
            "minimum": 0,
            "maximum": 9007199254740991
          },
          "amount_atomic": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "amount": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "decimals": {
            "type": "integer",
            "minimum": 0,
            "maximum": 9007199254740991
          },
          "asset": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "payee": {
            "type": "string",
            "pattern": "^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$"
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "timestamp_ms"
        ]
      }
    },
    "proposed": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "id": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "timestamp_ms": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 0,
          "maximum": 9007199254740991
        },
        "amount_atomic": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "amount": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "decimals": {
          "type": "integer",
          "minimum": 0,
          "maximum": 9007199254740991
        },
        "asset": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "payee": {
          "type": "string",
          "pattern": "^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "timestamp_ms"
      ]
    },
    "policy": {},
    "policy_path": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "now_ms": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 0,
      "maximum": 9007199254740991
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "proposed"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢verify_receipt(receipt, chain, key_url)

verify the recipient. Call this when you have a receipt and want to know whether it is genuine, without trusting the server that issued it. Returns VALID with the verdict it attests to, INVALID if the payload was altered, or UNVERIFIABLE when the key cannot be fetched — and UNVERIFIABLE is a refusal, not a pass. Pass `chain` instead of one receipt to walk a hash-chained list: it verifies every link and reports the first gap by index, with the receipt ids either side. Needs only the receipt JSON and a network connection; no account, no shared secret. Fetches the signing key from a published URL you can pin with key_url. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "receipt": {
      "description": "The receipt object as issued (omit when passing chain)"
    },
    "chain": {
      "description": "A hash-chained list of receipts; reports the first gap by index and the ids either side",
      "minItems": 1,
      "type": "array",
      "items": {}
    },
    "key_url": {
      "description": "Override the published key location",
      "type": "string",
      "format": "uri"
    }
  },
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢decode_payment_required(header)

verify the recipient. Call this first when a 402 response arrives and you cannot read the payment-required header. Returns the decoded x402 v2 challenge: scheme, network, asset, atomic amount, payee, resource and timeout. Pure decoding: no network call, no signature, no verdict — use evaluate_mcp_payment when you want a decision. Fails closed with a named error if the header is malformed or not base64. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "header": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "description": "The raw base64 value of the payment-required header"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "header"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢validate_policy(policy)

spending limits. Call this before wiring a policy into anything: a policy that fails validation makes every evaluation refuse, which looks like a product bug and is not one. Returns valid: true, or the exact field and message that is wrong. No payment needed, no network call, no key. Use it in CI on the policy file your agent ships with. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "policy": {}
  },
  "required": [
    "policy"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟡request_testnet_funds(address, faucetUrl)

test funds. Call this when you need Base Sepolia USDC to exercise the paid path end to end — one drip of 0.5 USDC per address per 24 hours, and the refusal tells you when it resets rather than just failing. Reads a public faucet: no key needed, no account, and it can only ever send testnet USDC. Use a throwaway address for anything automated; the cap is per address, so a script that generates a new address per call is not clever, it is why faucets get closed. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "address": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$"
    },
    "faucetUrl": {
      "type": "string",
      "format": "uri"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "address"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}
🟢evaluate_batch(payments, policy)

transaction scope. Call this when an agent might pay several times in one turn and you want one policy decision covering all of them. Verdict is pay | review | do_not_pay per item, in input order, with reason codes — so the agent can stop at the first refusal rather than discovering it after three payments. Read-only, holds no keys, never signs. Cheaper and more consistent than calling evaluate_mcp_payment in a loop: same policy, one round trip. Fails closed: do not invent authority — a missing policy, identity, cost or evidence is a refusal, never a default.

Esquema de entrada

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "payments": {
      "minItems": 1,
      "maxItems": 50,
      "type": "array",
      "items": {}
    },
    "policy": {}
  },
  "required": [
    "payments",
    "policy"
  ],
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
}

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