DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

FAST Pre-Action Audit ($0.01). Runs the response through the server's "default" policy: a substring check against 3 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety") with a 0.7 minimum-confidence threshold. Each forbidden match found costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.7, or any match is found, the verdict is NO_COMMIT and `reason` lists which phrase triggered it. Otherwise COMMIT. Use this as the default low-cost first-pass gate before a risky agent action; switch to dcl_evaluate_strict for a broader, higher-bar check, or to dcl_evaluate_jailbreak / dcl_evaluate_safety / dcl_evaluate_quality for a narrower, single-topic check instead of the general-purpose default policy.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The agent or LLM response text to audit.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_fastArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_mode": {
      "description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
      "title": "Drift Mode",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_score": {
      "description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
      "title": "Drift Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version",
    "drift_mode",
    "drift_score",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "title": "EvaluateResult"
}

STRICT Pre-Action Audit ($0.05). Runs the response against a broader, higher-bar "strict" policy: the union of all forbidden phrases from the default, anti-jailbreak, and safety policies (8 phrases total), with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold instead of the default policy's 0.7. Each matched phrase costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.85, or any phrase matches, the verdict is NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing every match found. Use this instead of dcl_evaluate_fast when the cost of a false COMMIT is high — e.g. before an irreversible or high-stakes agent action — since it catches jailbreak- and safety-adjacent phrasing that the plain default policy would miss.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The agent or LLM response text to audit.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_strictArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_mode": {
      "description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
      "title": "Drift Mode",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_score": {
      "description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
      "title": "Drift Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version",
    "drift_mode",
    "drift_score",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "title": "EvaluateResult"
}

PRE-ACTION Instruction Adherence Check ($0.02). Runs the "anti_jailbreak" policy: a substring check against 6 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety", "pretend you are", "act as if", "DAN") with a 0.8 minimum-confidence threshold — each match costs 0.4 confidence. Returns COMMIT if no phrase matches and confidence stays at or above 0.8, otherwise NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this as a targeted, cheaper check when the concern is specifically prompt-injection / persona-hijack risk; use dcl_evaluate_strict instead when you also want safety- and default-policy phrases covered in the same call.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The agent or LLM response text to check for jailbreak attempts.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreakArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_mode": {
      "description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
      "title": "Drift Mode",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_score": {
      "description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
      "title": "Drift Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version",
    "drift_mode",
    "drift_score",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "title": "EvaluateResult"
}

PRE-ACTION Baseline Safety Check ($0.01). Runs the "safety" policy: flags 2 forbidden disclaimers ("I cannot be held responsible", "no guarantees") and additionally REQUIRES the substring "AI" to appear somewhere in the response — missing it costs 0.2 confidence even with no forbidden phrase present. Minimum confidence is 0.75. Returns NO_COMMIT if confidence drops below 0.75, with `reason` naming the forbidden phrase found or the missing required pattern. Use this when you specifically need to confirm an AI-disclosure marker is present and the two disclaimer phrases are absent — not as a general-purpose safety net; for broader coverage use dcl_evaluate_fast or dcl_evaluate_strict instead.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The agent or LLM response text to check for safety violations.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_safetyArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_mode": {
      "description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
      "title": "Drift Mode",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_score": {
      "description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
      "title": "Drift Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version",
    "drift_mode",
    "drift_score",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "title": "EvaluateResult"
}

PRE-ACTION Content Quality & Drift Check ($0.03). Runs the "content_quality" policy: flags 12 absolutist or unverifiable-claim phrases (e.g. "guaranteed returns", "100% accurate", "studies show", "without a doubt") with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold — the highest bar of any single-policy tool. Returns NO_COMMIT if any phrase matches or confidence falls below 0.85, with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this to catch overconfident or unsubstantiated claims in generated content — a different concern from jailbreak or safety phrasing — e.g. before publishing agent-written copy or reports.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The agent or LLM response text to check for quality and drift.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_qualityArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_mode": {
      "description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
      "title": "Drift Mode",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "drift_score": {
      "description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
      "title": "Drift Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version",
    "drift_mode",
    "drift_score",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "title": "EvaluateResult"
}

POST-ACTION Secret & Credential Leak Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 categories (API keys, cloud credentials, tokens/JWTs, private keys, DB URLs, connection strings, env assignments, webhook secrets, internal endpoints with auth). Any finding results in NO_COMMIT.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The text to scan for exposed API keys, tokens, private keys, DB URLs, and other credentials.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_secretsArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if nothing was found, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "risk_score": {
      "description": "0.0-1.0 risk score based on number and severity of findings.",
      "title": "Risk Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matches found. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/DetectionFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "detection_count": {
      "description": "Number of findings.",
      "title": "Detection Count",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "categories_checked": {
      "description": "All checklist categories that were scanned.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "title": "Categories Checked",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "categories_clear": {
      "description": "Categories with no findings.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "title": "Categories Clear",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the scanned text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "risk_score",
    "findings",
    "detection_count",
    "categories_checked",
    "categories_clear",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "DetectionFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "The specific pattern category matched (e.g. 'api_key', 'email').",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "position": {
          "description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
          "title": "Position",
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "redacted_sample": {
          "description": "Masked version of the match — first 2 and last 4 chars only.",
          "title": "Redacted Sample",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical, major, or minor.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "category": {
          "description": "Checklist code, e.g. S1-S8 for secrets or T1-T8 for PII.",
          "title": "Category",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "provider": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string"
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "default": null,
          "description": "Identified provider/service, if known.",
          "title": "Provider"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "position",
        "redacted_sample",
        "severity",
        "category"
      ],
      "title": "DetectionFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "ScanResult"
}

POST-ACTION PII Detection Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 personal-data categories, with a Luhn checksum on card numbers to reduce false positives. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The text to scan for personal data: emails, phone numbers, national IDs, bank cards, IBANs, crypto addresses, IP addresses, passport numbers.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_piiArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if nothing was found, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "risk_score": {
      "description": "0.0-1.0 risk score based on number and severity of findings.",
      "title": "Risk Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matches found. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/DetectionFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "detection_count": {
      "description": "Number of findings.",
      "title": "Detection Count",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "categories_checked": {
      "description": "All checklist categories that were scanned.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "title": "Categories Checked",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "categories_clear": {
      "description": "Categories with no findings.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "title": "Categories Clear",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the scanned text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "risk_score",
    "findings",
    "detection_count",
    "categories_checked",
    "categories_clear",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp",
    "seal_text",
    "verify_url"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "DetectionFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "The specific pattern category matched (e.g. 'api_key', 'email').",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "position": {
          "description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
          "title": "Position",
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "redacted_sample": {
          "description": "Masked version of the match — first 2 and last 4 chars only.",
          "title": "Redacted Sample",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical, major, or minor.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "category": {
          "description": "Checklist code, e.g. S1-S8 for secrets or T1-T8 for PII.",
          "title": "Category",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "provider": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string"
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "default": null,
          "description": "Identified provider/service, if known.",
          "title": "Provider"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "position",
        "redacted_sample",
        "severity",
        "category"
      ],
      "title": "DetectionFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "ScanResult"
}

PRE-ACTION Bulk Processing ($0.10). Evaluates a list of items in one call; each item is a dict shaped {"response": str, "policy"?: str}, where policy defaults to "default" if omitted and may be any built-in policy name (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, content_quality). Each item gets its own independent COMMIT/NO_COMMIT verdict via the same logic as the matching single-item evaluate_* tool; results are returned in input order under `results`, plus a shared `batch_id`. Capped at 200 items per call — oversized batches are rejected. Use this instead of multiple single-item evaluate_* calls when checking several responses — optionally against different policies — in one priced call rather than paying per item separately.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "items": {
      "description": "List of items to evaluate, each shaped like {'response': str, 'policy'?: str}.",
      "items": {
        "additionalProperties": true,
        "type": "object"
      },
      "title": "Items",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the responses.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "items",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_batchArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "batch_id": {
      "description": "Unique identifier for this batch run.",
      "title": "Batch Id",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent whose responses were evaluated.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "count": {
      "description": "Number of items evaluated in this batch.",
      "title": "Count",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "results": {
      "description": "Per-item evaluation results, in input order.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/EvaluateResult"
      },
      "title": "Results",
      "type": "array"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "batch_id",
    "agent_id",
    "count",
    "results"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "EvaluateResult": {
      "properties": {
        "verdict": {
          "description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
          "title": "Verdict",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "confidence": {
          "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
          "title": "Confidence",
          "type": "number"
        },
        "reason": {
          "description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
          "title": "Reason",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "tx_hash": {
          "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
          "title": "Tx Hash",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "chain_index": {
          "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
          "title": "Chain Index",
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "input_hash": {
          "description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
          "title": "Input Hash",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "policy_version": {
          "description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
          "title": "Policy Version",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "drift_mode": {
          "description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
          "title": "Drift Mode",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "drift_score": {
          "description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
          "title": "Drift Score",
          "type": "number"
        },
        "timestamp": {
          "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
          "title": "Timestamp",
          "type": "number"
        },
        "seal_text": {
          "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
          "title": "Seal Text",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "verify_url": {
          "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
          "title": "Verify Url",
          "type": "string"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "verdict",
        "confidence",
        "reason",
        "tx_hash",
        "chain_index",
        "input_hash",
        "policy_version",
        "drift_mode",
        "drift_score",
        "timestamp",
        "seal_text",
        "verify_url"
      ],
      "title": "EvaluateResult",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "BatchResult"
}

SESSION Management ($0.05). Generates a new `pipeline_id` and returns session metadata (scope, expiry, initial drift_mode) for organizing a series of related checks under one identifier. Note: this call does not currently link the returned pipeline_id to later evaluate_* calls — there is no server-side session state that ties subsequent audits back to it; it is an identifier/timestamp issuer, not an active tracking session. Use this to obtain a shared reference ID for your own client-side grouping of a multi-step audit sequence; do not rely on it to automatically aggregate drift across calls.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that owns this session.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "scope": {
      "default": "default",
      "description": "Scope label for the session.",
      "title": "Scope",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "ttl_seconds": {
      "default": 3600,
      "description": "Session time-to-live, in seconds.",
      "title": "Ttl Seconds",
      "type": "integer"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_pipeline_startArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "pipeline_id": {
      "description": "Unique identifier for the newly opened pipeline session.",
      "title": "Pipeline Id",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that owns this session.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "scope": {
      "description": "Scope label for the session.",
      "title": "Scope",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "expires_at": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when the session expires.",
      "title": "Expires At",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "drift_mode": {
      "description": "Drift status at session start (always NORMAL for a new session).",
      "title": "Drift Mode",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "pipeline_id",
    "agent_id",
    "scope",
    "expires_at",
    "drift_mode"
  ],
  "title": "PipelineStartResult"
}

POST-ACTION Basic Audit ($0.10). Retrieves a record from the tamper-evident chain by tx_hash.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Transaction hash of the audit chain record to retrieve.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "tx_hash"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_audit_decodeArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "error": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Set if tx_hash was not found; other fields are omitted.",
      "title": "Error"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Hash of the audit chain record.",
      "title": "Tx Hash"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Identifier of the agent tied to this record.",
      "title": "Agent Id"
    },
    "verdict": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "COMMIT or NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict"
    },
    "reason": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Explanation recorded for the verdict.",
      "title": "Reason"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "number"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Confidence score recorded for the verdict.",
      "title": "Confidence"
    },
    "task_type": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Task type tag recorded with this entry.",
      "title": "Task Type"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "number"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Unix timestamp when the record was created.",
      "title": "Timestamp"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "integer"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Sequential index of the record in the chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index"
    },
    "prev_hash": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Hash of the preceding record in the chain.",
      "title": "Prev Hash"
    },
    "chain_integrity": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "True if the full chain verifies as intact.",
      "title": "Chain Integrity"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url"
    }
  },
  "title": "AuditResult"
}

POST-ACTION Deep Forensic Audit ($0.50). Extended output with drift_context and full chain integrity verification.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Transaction hash of the audit chain record to retrieve.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "tx_hash"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_audit_decode_deepArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "error": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Set if tx_hash was not found; other fields are omitted.",
      "title": "Error"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Hash of the audit chain record.",
      "title": "Tx Hash"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Identifier of the agent tied to this record.",
      "title": "Agent Id"
    },
    "verdict": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "COMMIT or NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict"
    },
    "reason": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Explanation recorded for the verdict.",
      "title": "Reason"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "number"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Confidence score recorded for the verdict.",
      "title": "Confidence"
    },
    "task_type": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Task type tag recorded with this entry.",
      "title": "Task Type"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "number"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Unix timestamp when the record was created.",
      "title": "Timestamp"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "integer"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Sequential index of the record in the chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index"
    },
    "prev_hash": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Hash of the preceding record in the chain.",
      "title": "Prev Hash"
    },
    "chain_integrity": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "True if the full chain verifies as intact.",
      "title": "Chain Integrity"
    },
    "seal_text": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
      "title": "Seal Text"
    },
    "verify_url": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
      "title": "Verify Url"
    },
    "tampered_at_index": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "integer"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Index where chain integrity broke, if any tampering was detected.",
      "title": "Tampered At Index"
    },
    "tamper_reason": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Why chain_integrity is False — a broken prev_hash link or an edited row whose stored tx_hash no longer matches its recomputed content hash.",
      "title": "Tamper Reason"
    },
    "drift_context": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "additionalProperties": true,
          "type": "object"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Extended forensic metadata captured at evaluation time.",
      "title": "Drift Context"
    }
  },
  "title": "AuditDeepResult"
}

PRE-ACTION Crypto Jailbreak & Injection Detection ($0.02). Crypto-specialized instruction-override/jailbreak/injection screen: standard role-switch and instruction-override patterns, plus crypto-specific drain-wallet injection (e.g. "transfer all funds to...", fake "test transaction" requesting full balance) and unlimited-approval injection (e.g. type(uint256).max, "approve unlimited allowance", skip-slippage-confirmation framing). Any match returns NO_COMMIT with `reason` and `findings` naming the matched category/categories; run this FIRST in the DCL crypto pipeline, before wallet/trade/MEV checks, since it screens the input itself rather than a decision built on top of it.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The incoming prompt or agent response to screen for crypto-specialized jailbreak/injection attempts.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced or received the text.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_cryptoArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if no injection pattern matched, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the crypto jailbreak policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "findings",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "CryptoFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical or major.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "regulatory_reference": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string"
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "default": null,
          "description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
          "title": "Regulatory Reference"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "severity"
      ],
      "title": "CryptoFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "JailbreakCryptoResult"
}

POST-ACTION Wallet Secret Guardian ($0.02). Scans for BIP-39 seed phrases (12 or 24 consecutive wordlist words), raw hex or WIF-format private keys, Ethereum/Bitcoin wallet addresses, and API keys/bearer tokens appearing near wallet/custody/signing terminology. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT — wallet secrets have no safe threshold, unlike other DCL evaluators. Returns a `sanitized_output` with all matches redacted (null if nothing was found) and a masked `redacted_sample` per finding — the real value is never returned or stored server-side.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The text to scan for seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses, and wallet-context API credentials.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_walletArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if nothing was found, otherwise NO_COMMIT. Wallet secrets have no safe threshold.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matches found. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/WalletFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "sanitized_output": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Input text with all matches redacted. Null if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "title": "Sanitized Output"
    },
    "risk_score": {
      "description": "0.0-1.0 risk score based on number and severity of findings.",
      "title": "Risk Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the scanned text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "policy_version": {
      "description": "Version of the wallet-guardian policy that was applied.",
      "title": "Policy Version",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "findings",
    "risk_score",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "policy_version",
    "timestamp"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "WalletFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "seed_phrase, private_key, wallet_address, or wallet_api_credential.",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "position": {
          "description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
          "title": "Position",
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "redacted_sample": {
          "description": "Masked version of the match — never the real value.",
          "title": "Redacted Sample",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical or major.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "position",
        "redacted_sample",
        "severity"
      ],
      "title": "WalletFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "WalletResult"
}

PRE-ACTION Trade Decision Verifier ($0.02). Screens trade-decision language for guaranteed-return claims, zero-risk/"can't lose" framing, and unqualified "buy/sell X now" directives — any match is NO_COMMIT. If no unsafe language is found, COMMIT additionally requires the word "risk" to appear anywhere in the text as a minimum disclosure marker; its absence alone triggers NO_COMMIT with `reason` noting the missing disclosure. Produces an immutable `trade_receipt` (tx_hash/chain_hash/chain_depth) distinct from the top-level audit hash, for downstream systems that specifically need a trade-shaped receipt object.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The trade decision or recommendation text to screen.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_tradeArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the trade decision's language passed the screen, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "trade_receipt": {
      "$ref": "#/$defs/TradeReceipt",
      "description": "Immutable receipt for this trade-verification record."
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "findings",
    "trade_receipt",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "CryptoFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical or major.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "regulatory_reference": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string"
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "default": null,
          "description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
          "title": "Regulatory Reference"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "severity"
      ],
      "title": "CryptoFinding",
      "type": "object"
    },
    "TradeReceipt": {
      "properties": {
        "tx_hash": {
          "description": "Tamper-evident proof of this specific trade-verification record.",
          "title": "Tx Hash",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "chain_hash": {
          "description": "Hash of the previous commit in the append-only chain that this one links to.",
          "title": "Chain Hash",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "chain_depth": {
          "description": "This record's position (index) in the chain.",
          "title": "Chain Depth",
          "type": "integer"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "tx_hash",
        "chain_hash",
        "chain_depth"
      ],
      "title": "TradeReceipt",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "TradeResult"
}

POST-ACTION MEV & Market-Abuse Compliance Screen ($0.03). Text-level screen (not a mempool/transaction analyzer) for front-running/sandwich-attack language, wash trading/layering/spoofing, KYC/AML red flags (mixers, structuring, obscuring fund origin), and pump-and-dump/rug-pull language. Any critical-severity finding, or two or more major-severity findings, returns NO_COMMIT; a single major-severity finding is also returned as NO_COMMIT but with a distinctly higher `confidence` (~0.55 vs ~0.05-0.2 for harder violations) so downstream callers can tell a soft single flag apart from a hard multi-finding block. Each finding includes an illustrative `regulatory_reference` tag (MiFID II, FCA, or an EU AI Act article).

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The agent or LLM response text describing or proposing an on-chain/trading action, to screen for MEV and market-abuse language.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_mevArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response passed the MEV/compliance screen, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "findings",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "CryptoFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical or major.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "regulatory_reference": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string"
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "default": null,
          "description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
          "title": "Regulatory Reference"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "severity"
      ],
      "title": "CryptoFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "MevResult"
}

POST-ACTION Market Signal Fabrication Screen ($0.03). Pattern-based heuristic on the output text alone (no source price feed) — flags guaranteed-price-prediction language ("will definitely hit $X"), absolute-certainty claims ("100% certain", "cannot go down"), a fabricated-price flag when a specific dollar figure co-occurs with a guaranteed-outcome claim, and an invented-token flag when a "$TICKER" cashtag doesn't match a small set of well-known symbols (false positives are possible for legitimate lesser-known tickers — this is a heuristic pre-check, not ground truth). For a full claim-by-claim check against an actual price-feed snapshot, use the local grounding workflow instead of this live tool. Verdict/confidence collapsing follows the same rule as dcl_evaluate_mev: any critical finding or 2+ major findings is a hard NO_COMMIT; exactly one major finding is a softer NO_COMMIT at ~0.55 confidence.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The market signal, analysis, or price-prediction text to screen.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_signalArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if no fabrication/overconfidence pattern matched, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "reason": {
      "description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
      "title": "Reason",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "reason",
    "findings",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "CryptoFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical or major.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "regulatory_reference": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string"
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "default": null,
          "description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
          "title": "Regulatory Reference"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "severity"
      ],
      "title": "CryptoFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "SignalResult"
}

FINAL-GATE Output Sanitizer ($0.02). Post-processing checkpoint that strips secrets/credentials, PII, crypto material (seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses), internal network details (private IPs, MAC addresses, .internal/.local/.corp hostnames), and unsafe shell/SQL/path-traversal fragments from a raw model response — plus a narrow, high-precision safety net for direct self-harm-instruction-seeking and targeted-harassment phrasing (not a general toxicity classifier). Returns a single `sanitized_output` with every match replaced by `[REDACTED]`; use that instead of the original whenever verdict is NO_COMMIT. Run this as the LAST gate before a response reaches its destination — after `dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto`/other input-side checks have already run, and immediately before `dcl_commit` seals the final decision. Internally re-uses the same detection tables as `dcl_evaluate_secrets`/`dcl_evaluate_pii` for the secrets/PII categories, so results stay consistent with those tools.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "response": {
      "description": "The raw LLM/agent response to sanitize before it is delivered to a user, downstream agent, or external system.",
      "title": "Response",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "response",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizerArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "verdict": {
      "description": "COMMIT if the response was clean, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
      "title": "Verdict",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "confidence": {
      "description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
      "title": "Confidence",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "violations": {
      "description": "Distinct finding types matched (e.g. ['api_key', 'internal_ip']). Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "title": "Violations",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "findings": {
      "description": "All matches found, with position/severity/category detail. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "items": {
        "$ref": "#/$defs/SanitizerFinding"
      },
      "title": "Findings",
      "type": "array"
    },
    "sanitized_output": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "type": "string"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Input text with every match replaced by [REDACTED]. Null if verdict is COMMIT.",
      "title": "Sanitized Output"
    },
    "redaction_count": {
      "description": "Total number of items redacted.",
      "title": "Redaction Count",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "risk_score": {
      "description": "0.0-1.0 composite severity score.",
      "title": "Risk Score",
      "type": "number"
    },
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_index": {
      "description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
      "title": "Chain Index",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the sanitized text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "verdict",
    "confidence",
    "violations",
    "findings",
    "redaction_count",
    "risk_score",
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_index",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp"
  ],
  "$defs": {
    "SanitizerFinding": {
      "properties": {
        "type": {
          "description": "e.g. api_key, email, seed_phrase, internal_ip, mac_address, internal_hostname, self_harm_instruction, targeted_harassment, shell_injection, sql_injection, path_traversal, and others.",
          "title": "Type",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "position": {
          "description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
          "title": "Position",
          "type": "integer"
        },
        "redacted_sample": {
          "description": "Masked version of the match — never the real value.",
          "title": "Redacted Sample",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "severity": {
          "description": "critical, major, or minor.",
          "title": "Severity",
          "type": "string"
        },
        "category": {
          "description": "secrets, pii, crypto, network, toxic, or unsafe_instructions.",
          "title": "Category",
          "type": "string"
        }
      },
      "required": [
        "type",
        "position",
        "redacted_sample",
        "severity",
        "category"
      ],
      "title": "SanitizerFinding",
      "type": "object"
    }
  },
  "title": "OutputSanitizerResult"
}

FINAL-STEP Leibniz Layer Crypto Commit ($0.01). Writes a trading/agent decision to the append-only Leibniz Layer audit chain and returns a Merkle-proof-style receipt: `tx_hash` (proof of this specific commit), `chain_hash` (the previous commit's hash, linking this one into the chain), and `chain_depth` (this commit's position in the chain). Unlike the evaluate_* tools, this call has no pass/fail verdict of its own — it always succeeds and simply seals the decision. Passing `prior_checks` is optional but recommended: it records which earlier pipeline steps (firewall/wallet/trade/MEV) this specific commit is downstream of, in one auditable record. Always run this LAST, after every other crypto-suite check has passed.

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "decision": {
      "description": "The final trading/agent decision text to commit to the audit chain.",
      "title": "Decision",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "agent_id": {
      "description": "Identifier of the agent whose decision is being committed.",
      "title": "Agent Id",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "prior_checks": {
      "anyOf": [
        {
          "additionalProperties": true,
          "type": "object"
        },
        {
          "type": "null"
        }
      ],
      "default": null,
      "description": "Optional dict of tx_hashes from earlier pipeline steps (e.g. {'prompt_firewall_tx_hash': ..., 'trade_verifier_tx_hash': ..., 'mev_compliance_tx_hash': ...}), linking this commit to the specific checks that passed before it.",
      "title": "Prior Checks"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "decision",
    "agent_id"
  ],
  "title": "dcl_commitArguments"
}

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "tx_hash": {
      "description": "Tamper-evident proof of this specific commit.",
      "title": "Tx Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the previous commit in the append-only chain that this one links to.",
      "title": "Chain Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "chain_depth": {
      "description": "This commit's position (index) in the chain.",
      "title": "Chain Depth",
      "type": "integer"
    },
    "input_hash": {
      "description": "Hash of the committed decision text (raw content is never stored).",
      "title": "Input Hash",
      "type": "string"
    },
    "timestamp": {
      "description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
      "title": "Timestamp",
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "tx_hash",
    "chain_hash",
    "chain_depth",
    "input_hash",
    "timestamp"
  ],
  "title": "CommitResult"
}