Verdict L402

Ask if an action is safe before your agent runs it: injection, shell, MCP installs. Free samples.

使うべきか

品質と安全性

A
説明の品質
100%
スキーマの完全性
100%
命名の品質
80%
ポイズニングのリスク
100%
権限の一致
100%
プロトコルへの準拠
100%

ツール定義とプロトコルへの準拠に関する自動分析に基づいています。

コンテキストコスト

~567トークン数(ツール定義)
~934 B一般的なレスポンスサイズ
注意への影響は最小限(128k コンテキストの 0.44%)

これは、サーバーのツールがモデルのコンテキストに読み込まれるたびに消費されるおおよそのトークン数です。数が多いほど、ほかのタスクに使える注意が減ります。

インストール

ワンクリックインストール

これを `claude_desktop_config.json` ファイルに追加してください:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verdictl402": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "@kechlab/verdict-mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

実行可能なパッケージ

npm@kechlab/verdict-mcp0.2.1stdio

リモートエンドポイント

https://verdict.kechlab.com/mcpstreamable-http

できること

ツール一覧

ツール(4)

🟢 読み取り専用🟡 書き込み🔴 削除⚪ 不明
🟢verdict_guard(text)

Free sample. Before your agent reads untrusted text (web page, email, document, tool output), check it for prompt injection, data exfiltration requests, secrets and toxic content. Returns allow, review or block with scores and reasons. Use it on text you did not write. Do not use it to judge an action: use verdict_firewall.

入力スキーマ

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "text": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The untrusted text to examine (4000 characters maximum in free samples)."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "text"
  ]
}
🟢verdict_command_gate(command, intent)

Free sample. Before a coding agent runs a shell command, ask whether to allow, review or block it: root deletion, download and run, privilege escalation, secret exfiltration. Pass the human intent when you know it. Not a sandbox: it reads the command, it does not run it.

入力スキーマ

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "command": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The shell command the agent wants to run."
    },
    "intent": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional. What the human asked the agent to do."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "command"
  ]
}
⚪verdict_mcp_vet(name, description, tools, permissions)

Free sample. Before installing an MCP server, skill or tool: is its description poisoned (hidden orders to the agent, excessive permissions, look-alike names)? Returns allow, review or block with reasons.

入力スキーマ

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Name of the tool or server."
    },
    "description": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The description text it exposes to the agent."
    },
    "tools": {
      "type": "array",
      "description": "Optional list of { name, description } of the functions it exposes.",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      }
    },
    "permissions": {
      "type": "array",
      "description": "Optional permissions requested, for example filesystem:write, network, shell.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "name",
    "description"
  ]
}
🟢verdict_firewall(goal, content, action)

Free sample. Before an agent acts on untrusted content (pay, send, delete, click, reply), give the human goal, the content it read and the action it proposes. Returns allow, review or block: it catches actions that follow orders hidden in the content.

入力スキーマ

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "goal": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The objective the human gave."
    },
    "content": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The untrusted content the agent read."
    },
    "action": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The action the agent wants to run (tool call, command, payment)."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "goal",
    "content",
    "action"
  ]
}

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