Verdict L402

Ask if an action is safe before your agent runs it: injection, shell, MCP installs. Free samples.

我該用這個嗎

品質與安全性

A
說明品質
100%
結構描述完整度
100%
命名品質
80%
汙染風險
100%
權限相符程度
100%
協定合規性
100%

根據工具定義與協定合規性的自動化分析。

上下文成本

~567Token(工具定義)
~934 B典型回應大小
極小的注意力影響(128k 上下文的 0.44%)

這是每次將伺服器的工具載入模型上下文時所消耗的約略 token 數量。數量越高,可用於其他工作的注意力就越少。

安裝

一鍵安裝

將以下內容加入你的 `claude_desktop_config.json` 檔案:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verdictl402": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "@kechlab/verdict-mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

可執行的套件

npm@kechlab/verdict-mcp0.2.1stdio

遠端端點

https://verdict.kechlab.com/mcpstreamable-http

它能做什麼

工具清單

工具(4)

🟢 唯讀🟡 寫入🔴 刪除⚪ 未知
🟢verdict_guard(text)

Free sample. Before your agent reads untrusted text (web page, email, document, tool output), check it for prompt injection, data exfiltration requests, secrets and toxic content. Returns allow, review or block with scores and reasons. Use it on text you did not write. Do not use it to judge an action: use verdict_firewall.

輸入結構描述

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "text": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The untrusted text to examine (4000 characters maximum in free samples)."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "text"
  ]
}
🟢verdict_command_gate(command, intent)

Free sample. Before a coding agent runs a shell command, ask whether to allow, review or block it: root deletion, download and run, privilege escalation, secret exfiltration. Pass the human intent when you know it. Not a sandbox: it reads the command, it does not run it.

輸入結構描述

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "command": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The shell command the agent wants to run."
    },
    "intent": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional. What the human asked the agent to do."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "command"
  ]
}
⚪verdict_mcp_vet(name, description, tools, permissions)

Free sample. Before installing an MCP server, skill or tool: is its description poisoned (hidden orders to the agent, excessive permissions, look-alike names)? Returns allow, review or block with reasons.

輸入結構描述

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Name of the tool or server."
    },
    "description": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The description text it exposes to the agent."
    },
    "tools": {
      "type": "array",
      "description": "Optional list of { name, description } of the functions it exposes.",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      }
    },
    "permissions": {
      "type": "array",
      "description": "Optional permissions requested, for example filesystem:write, network, shell.",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "name",
    "description"
  ]
}
🟢verdict_firewall(goal, content, action)

Free sample. Before an agent acts on untrusted content (pay, send, delete, click, reply), give the human goal, the content it read and the action it proposes. Returns allow, review or block: it catches actions that follow orders hidden in the content.

輸入結構描述

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "goal": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The objective the human gave."
    },
    "content": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The untrusted content the agent read."
    },
    "action": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The action the agent wants to run (tool call, command, payment)."
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "goal",
    "content",
    "action"
  ]
}

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