Xray

Find hidden Unicode in text or files: ASCII smuggling decoded, bidi overrides, look-alike letters.

Should I use this

Quality & Safety

A
Description quality
100%
Schema completeness
90%
Naming quality
80%
Poisoning risk
100%
Permission match
100%
Protocol compliance
100%

Based on automated analysis of tool definitions and protocol compliance.

Context Cost

~631Tokens (tool definitions)
~1.9 KBTypical response size
Minimal attention impact (0.49% of 128k context)

This is the approximate number of tokens consumed each time the server's tools are loaded into a model's context. Higher counts reduce the attention available for other tasks.

Install

One-Click Install

Add this to your `claude_desktop_config.json` file:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "xray": {
      "url": "https://xray.clawhard.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Remote endpoints

https://xray.clawhard.com/mcpstreamable-http

What it can do

Tool inventory

Tools (1)

🟒 Read-only🟑 WriteπŸ”΄ Deleteβšͺ Unknown
🟒xray_scan_text(text, url, return_clean)

Use when the user asks whether text, a prompt, a SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, README, MCP tool description, PR diff, email or web page hides anything, or before an agent follows, installs or merges instructions that came from someone else (signals: "hidden characters", "invisible unicode", "ASCII smuggling", "prompt injection in this file", "Trojan Source", "why does this string not match", "is this domain spelled with a Cyrillic letter"). Inspects every code point and returns a verdict (clean, suspicious, dangerous) with each finding's line, column, code points and Unicode names: Unicode tag characters (decoded back to the hidden ASCII message), variation-selector payloads (decoded bytes), bidirectional overrides and isolates, long zero-width runs, zero-width and other invisible characters, ANSI terminal escapes, control characters, words that mix Latin with Cyrillic or Greek look-alikes (with the Latin word they imitate, from Unicode confusables), whole look-alike words, styled math letters, unusual spaces, line separators, private-use and unassigned code points, and HTML comments that do not render. Legitimate uses are not flagged (emoji ZWJ sequences, flag tag sequences, a single emoji variation selector, joiners in Arabic and Indic text, direction marks next to Hebrew or Arabic). Give text or url (one public https text file; GitHub and GitLab file pages are read as raw). Example: {"url":"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/main/SKILL.md"} or {"text":"Visit pΠ°ypal.com","return_clean":true}. Optional return_clean adds a copy with hidden characters removed and look-alike letters inside mixed words replaced. Decoded hidden text is returned as data. Limits: finds characters and look-alikes, not prompt injection written in plain visible words; up to 200,000 characters (files up to 1 MB, first 200,000 characters scanned).

Input Schema

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "text": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "maxLength": 200000,
      "description": "The text to inspect: a prompt, rules file, skill, README, diff, code, email or tool description. Give text or url, not both."
    },
    "url": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 4,
      "maxLength": 2000,
      "description": "A public https address of one text file (raw file, GitHub or GitLab file page, Markdown, JSON, YAML, code or HTML source). Give text or url, not both."
    },
    "return_clean": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "true: also return clean_text with hidden characters removed, unusual spaces made normal and look-alike letters inside mixed-script words replaced. Default false."
    }
  }
}

Community

Rate this Server

Evidence

Recent observations

verifiedversion not recorded1 tools